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the foreword, when stating, “The non-dualist alternative explored in the 
pages that follow is the resurrection of the body (XII).” Neither Cartesian 
nor non-Cartesian versions of substance dualism find their way into the 
discussion. This dismissal is intimately tied to the perennial problem 
concerning bodily persistence faced in the book.
Gasser in commenting on the views represented in the book, states: 
“No solution is able to preserve identity in the strict sense (p. 9).” If no 
view provides this kind of identity and personal identity depends upon 
a body that is strictly the same, then the materialist will have difficulty 
accounting for personal identity, as well, because for most versions of 
materialism personal identity is predicated upon same body/brain. 
Alternative solutions that are able to account for persistence of personal 
identity and, possibly bodily identity, include a form of immaterialism, 
substance dualism or Thomistic hylomorphism with the soul/form having 
ens per se kind of existence. both of these views account for personal 
identity by affirming an immaterial entity endures through somatic death 
to the physical resurrection. Nonetheless, how might they account for 
the body? one answer may be that an enduring soul only needs a similar 
body, or, alternatively, the soul provides the sufficient conditions for the 
new body. In the final analysis, it is clear that to dismiss dualist views of 
persons is unwarranted. unpopular though it may be, substance dualism 
has something to contribute to the contemporary discussion.
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The title of a recent biography of David Hume is The Great Infidel and 
almost all interpreters of Hume, from his contemporaries on, have 
taken him to be an atheist, agnostic or some kind of deist. In Hume’s 
works, though, there are many instances of what Timothy Yoder calls 
‘affirmation passages’ where Hume seems to acknowledge the existence of 
the traditional God of theism. These are usually written off as mere irony 
and seen as part of a strategy of concealment for reasons of prudence 
given the dangers of open avowal of atheism in the eighteenth century. 
much of Yoder’s book focuses on these passages and on the purposes 
to which authors put various kinds of irony. He highlights ‘covering 
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irony’ – or, in the context of religion, ‘theological lying’ – in which 
there is a private and a public message: it is intended that an audience 
understand something different from the explicit declaration, and there 
is often a twist where the public message is portrayed as ridiculous and 
those shrewd enough to understand the private message thus see its 
superior force. Hume is usually taken to be adopting such a strategy: the 
private message is sceptical whereas the public message is pious. Yoder, 
however, asks us to ‘not be too hasty to identify irony in an author’s 
writings unless a straightforward reading can be ruled out’ (p. 34) – ‘not 
every religious proposition that [Hume] asserts is automatically to be 
viewed as disingenuous or insincere.’ (p. 50) Yoder thinks ‘it is time for 
a reevaluation of Hume on God, ... a fresh reading.’ (p. 20) And in order 
to provide such a  reading, Yoder offers a  hermeneutic procedure for 
determining whether passages in a text should be taken as ironic and, 
if so, for determining their role. Suggestive of irony are certain explicit 
hints contained in titles and epigraphs, known errors and contradictory 
claims made by the author, inconsistencies in style or vocabulary, and 
conflicts between the text and the author’s known or expected beliefs.
In certain ways Yoder’s resultant interpretation of Hume is uncontro-
versial. His Hume is critical of organised religion and of Christianity in 
particular. Irony is sometimes used in his attacks on religion for reasons 
of politeness since many of Hume’s friends were religious. Hume’s irony 
also results in some very funny commentary on religion and examples are 
given of Hume’s sometimes ‘dripping sarcasm’ (p. 27). (Hume’s History of 
England could also have been mined for sarcasm and humour.)
There is, though, a surprise. Hume may be critical of ‘vulgar’ religious 
beliefs and practices – of, for example, petitionary prayer – but Yoder 
argues that Hume does accept that there is a  transcendent being who 
created the universe, ‘the one true and surpassing God, who created all 
and governs the universe according to his eternal laws, written out of his 
supreme power and wisdom.’ (p. 92) belief in such a being constitutes 
‘true religion’ or ‘genuine theism’. Yoder claims that ‘the testimony of one 
of history’s great sceptics and thinkers is that there is a god – a sobering 
message to a secular age.’ (p. 146)
Yoder supports these claims with a close reading of some of Hume’s 
works. In the Natural History of Religion (NHr), religions old and new 
come in for hostile criticism, but there are also several affirmation 
passages and Yoder takes these at face value.
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[T]he whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and 
no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief 
a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and 
religion. (NHr, Introduction; Yoder, p. 6)
The Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (DNr) is a work usually taken 
to be destructive not only of popular religion but also of the argument 
from design and natural theology in general. First, Yoder supports the 
plausible interpretation that there is no one interlocutor that speaks for 
Hume, but that we must ‘distil the truths that emerge from the froth 
of the entire debate’ (p. 99) between Philo (the sceptic), Demea (the 
mystic) and Cleanthes (proponent of the argument from design). Philo’s 
perplexing ‘reversal’, where he seems to affirm belief in the existence 
of God after having in the preceding parts of the book undermined 
natural theology, is a conundrum for any interpreter of Hume. At first 
blush certain clues suggest irony – Philo, for example, seems to make 
contradictory statements concerning the existence of God – but this, 
Yoder argues, is because Philo is considering two distinct arguments: 
he is critical of arguments that support an anthropocentric idea of God 
but does affirm the existence of God via a  distinct kind of argument 
from design. There is therefore no reversal. Philo’s sentiments are 
unfeigned: ‘no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind 
... a purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most careless, 
the most stupid thinker.’ (DNr 12.2; Yoder, p. 110) The argument that 
Philo accepts is not an argument from analogy (although Yoder admits 
the form of Hume’s argument is not explicit in the text); rather, when we 
observe the intricate order of nature ‘the idea of a contriver [designer] ... 
flow[s] in upon you with a force like that of sensation’ (DNr 3.7; Yoder, 
p. 105). The awe we feel in the presence of nature entails that ‘it is as if 
we have witnessed first-hand the fashioning of [for example] the human 
eye by the hand of God.’ (p. 105) Given, though, the importance of Philo’s 
beliefs to an interpretation of Hume on religion, this suggestion requires 
more careful development. In particular more could have been done to 
show how this interpretation is consistent with Hume’s account of the 
mind. The awe to which Yoder refers would seem to be what Hume calls 
an impression of reflection, an emotional response to our experience of 
nature. but what is not clear is how such a response should be seen as 
having divine content.
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Yoder compares Hume’s position with that of english deists such as 
Herbert of Cherbury, the earl of Shaftesbury and John Toland. many 
of their views were shared by Hume: their condemnation of priestcraft 
and ecclesiastical corruption, their rejection of the bible as the word of 
God and in particular their sceptical attitude to miracles. Hume, though 
– Yoder argues – should not be seen as a deist in this tradition since he 
did not see reason, in particular the analogical version of the argument 
from design, as providing support for his theistic beliefs, as deists did; 
neither did he take religion to be important with respect to morality 
(again something to which deists were generally committed, so Yoder 
argues). There are no practical consequences to Hume’s true religion. 
We have no reason to believe in an afterlife or in particular providence, 
God’s direct involvement with humanity, and Hume’s God is morally 
indifferent. The affirmation texts may ascribe intelligence and power to 
God – Demea’s mysticism is rejected; we can have knowledge of God 
and his attributes – but Yoder interprets Hume as arguing for ‘amoral 
theism’ (p. 143) and against Cleanthes’ view that ‘the proper office of 
religion is to regulate the hearts of man, humanize their conduct, infuse 
the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience’ (DNr 12.12; Yoder, p. 
110). Thus Hume’s God requires and deserves no worship. Yoder also 
distinguishes his approach from John Gaskin’s interpretation of Hume 
as an attenuated deist, that is, as only being committed to the minimal 
claim that ‘the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear 
some remote analogy to human intelligence’ (DNr 12.32; Yoder, p. 111). 
Yoder takes such an interpretation to be anachronistic since it is purged 
of any of the religious aspects that were integral to eighteenth century 
deism. This minimal claim is also the conclusion of an argument from 
analogy, a  form of argument (Yoder argues) that does not for Hume 
underpin true religion.
Yoder’s book does have something valuable to offer Humean 
scholarship. Careful consideration of the affirmation passages must be 
an essential priority for anyone trying to get to the bottom of Hume’s 
views on religion and Yoder provides a corrective to lazy ascription of 
irony to anything that is at odds with one’s own favoured interpretation. 
It is all too easy to write off difficult passages as ironic – Yoder asks 
us to consider more carefully the alternatives. It is also good to see 
attention paid to how Hume relates to eighteenth century deism and the 
controversies surrounding it.
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However, Yoder’s interpretation of Hume is not persuasive. The 
most serious omission is wider discussion of Hume’s scepticism. It 
looks difficult to align Yoder’s interpretation with Hume’s mitigated 
scepticism and claims such as this from the Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding (eHu 8.1):
[I]f men attempt the discussion of questions, which lie entirely beyond 
the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of 
worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, 
they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at 
any determinate conclusion.
Yoder focuses mainly on the Natural History and the Dialogues whereas 
it would be useful to look elsewhere, particularly at the Treatise, of which 
there is much relevant to religious belief. A particularly surprising claim 
by Yoder is that ‘[i]t is clear, Hume argues, that divine providence stands 
behind every cause and effect that we observe.’ (p. 137) A passage in the 
essay ‘of the Immortality of the Soul’ is taken to support this view, but 
Yoder makes no mention of how this is sharply at odds with Hume’s 
Treatise account of causation. According to a traditional interpretation 
of Hume, causation amounts merely to constant conjunction and thus 
there is no room for the idea of God’s power to bring things about – we 
do not therefore have any idea of God’s omnipotence or his providence 
with respect to particular effects in the world. The alleged subversively 
irreligious consequences of Hume’s Treatise account of causation were 
well known to his contemporaries and they demand more attention 
than Yoder affords. Hume’s candidacy for the chair in moral philosophy 
at edinburgh university was opposed by those who took his religious 
views to be suspect. That it was in part his account of causation that 
caused offence is clear from Hume’s A Letter from a Gentleman to his 
Friend in Edinburgh, his reply to a no longer extant pamphlet that was 
circulated in opposition to his candidature.
Yoder does consider a  passage concerning causation from the first 
Enquiry (eHu 11.30), but admits that it ‘ends on a note of skepticism’ 
(p. 119): Hume argues that we only come to infer the existence of a cause 
when we have experienced the constant conjunction of particular causes 
and effects before, and such an interpretation is therefore problematic in 
the context of the singular event of divine creation. Yoder’s response to 
this worry is unsatisfactory. He claims merely that ‘Hume is rounding 
out the give and take of a philosophical conversation, and laying out the 
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options for the reader to consider’ (ibid.). Interpreting Hume’s views on 
religion is no easy task, but Yoder’s interpretation is rather forced and it 
is hard not to see the author projecting his own views onto Hume.
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earl Stanley b. Fronda does not want to give a  new interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion. His book is more or less the 
defence of the orthodox Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion against 
its widespread criticism. Although the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of religion given by Dewi Zephaniah Phillips and other 
followers of Wittgenstein is very well known among Wittgenstein 
scholars, there are still rather unconvincing prejudices concerning this 
subject in the academic community. There are still many philosophers 
who claim that Wittgenstein was a  fideist, a  non-realist, or a  crypto 
atheist. Fronda wants to show that none of these claims is true. He argues 
that it is necessary to adopt the perspective of apophatic theology if you 
do not want to misunderstand Wittgenstein. This idea is very well known 
since the 60ies and 70ies of the last century, although in the last decade 
no scholar defended this idea as intensely as Fronda does. As Fronda 
did not deal more deeply with Wittgenstein’s and Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of religion before 2005 and as Fronda seems to have been 
confronted with many strong prejudices against Wittgenstein, he thinks 
that it is necessary to write a  book which shows that many scholars 
still misunderstand Wittgenstein as a  fideist. Thus, although there is 
nothing new in Fronda’s book and nearly nothing of deeper interest for 
Wittgenstein scholars, it may be a helpful book for people who are not 
so familiar with Wittgenstein’s religious thought searching for a  first 
introduction. For serious scholarly work, it might be interesting how 
profoundly Fronda stresses the importance of apophatic theology for 
the understanding of the whole philosophical work of Wittgenstein. 
Although this idea is rather familiar in Wittgensteinian scholarship, it 
has – as far as I know – never been elaborated at such length before.
